RECENT CASES
142 N.Y.S. 387 (i9x3) where the clerk who prepared the checks, was in effect held to
be the "maker."
In the absence of negligence or estoppel the paying bank may charge the maker's
account only according to his orders and direction. Phoenix Bank v. Risley, iii U.S.
125, 4 Sup. Ct. 322, 28 L.Ed. 374 (x884); Shipman v. Bank of N.Y., 126 N.Y. 318, 27
N.E. 371, 12 L.R.A. 711 (Y891). The depositor's duty to use care in dealings with the
bank extends to the examination of the returned vouchers. JordanMarsh Co. v. Nat.
Shawmnut Bank, 2O Mass. 397, 87 N.E. 740, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 250 (19o9); contra
Walker v. Manchester Co., io8 L.T. (N.S.) 728 (19o3); Rex v. Bank of Montreal, ii Ont.

L.R. 595 (i9o6). The duty does not extend to the examination of the indorsements.
Corn Exch. Bank v. Nassau Bank, or N.Y. 74 (i883); Nat. Surely Co. v. ManhattanCo.,
252 N.Y. 247 (X929). Hence plaintiff was not negligent in failing to discover the forgeries sooner. Justices Lehman and Kellog dissenting were of the opinion that the
"self-identifying" feature was enough to work an estoppel. The majority, on the facts
of the case, came to the conclusion that no reliance in fact had been placed on the
identifying device.
Even though the city had accepted the monthly statements as stated accounts such
could be opened by a showing of fraud or mistake. Nat. Surety Co. v. Manhattan Co.,
supra.
KARL. Hun3ER

Bulk Sales-"Other Goods and Chattels of the Vendor's Business"-Illinois].The "old" bank sold real estate bonds to complainant and agreed to repurchase at par
if requested. Later the old bank transferred all its assets to the "new" bank, which assumed only specified liabilities. Complainant sought to recover the purchase price of
the bonds from both institutions, alleging among other things, that the transfer to the
"new" bank was void under the Bulk Sales Law. Held, the Bulk Sales Law does not
apply to the transfer of the assets of a bank since, being in derogation of the common
law it should be strictly construed. Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank and Madison-Kedzie Trust & Savings Bank, 269 Ill. App. 588 (1933).
The Illinois Bulk Sales Law of 195o, Ill. Laws of 19o5, 284, was held unconstitutional
because it singled out a class-vendors and purchasers of stocks of merchandise--on
which it imposed exceptional burdens. Off & Co. v. Morehead, 235 Ill. 4o, 85 N.E. 264
the sale, trans(19o8). To avoid this objection the statute of 1913 was worded" ......
of a stock of merchandise, or merchandise and fixtures or
fer, or assignment ....

other goods and chattels of the vendor's business ..... " Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stats.
(1931), c. 2ia, § i. This statute was held constitutional. Johnson Co. v. Beloosky, 263
Ill. 363, 105 N.E. 287, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 411 (1914).

There followed a period of uncertainty in interpretation. In Larson v. Judd, 200 Ill.
App. 420 (i916) the court said that the act covered the sale of the cattle, horses, and
equipment of a dairyman. The sale of office furniture, horses, wagons, trucks, harness,
farm machinery, hogs, growing corn, etc., by a man engaged in the dray business and
farming was within the statute. Athon v. McAllister, 205 Ill. App. 41 (1917). On the
other hand was a holding that the act related only to businesses where in the ordinary
course goods were not sold in bulk, and that the sale of a team of horses and a wagon
was exempt from the act's requirements. Richardson Coal Co. v. Cermak, 19 Ill. App.
io6 (i914). Similarly in Ettelson v. Sonkopp, 2io Ill. App. 348 (I918) it was held that
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the Bulk Sales Law did not apply to a transaction not involving merchandise, but concerned fixtures, utensils, and a horse and wagon used by the vendor in his butcher shop.
Although the decisions of other courts mean little since the Illinois statute is worded
more broadly than those of other states, Montgomery, Bulk Sales (2d ed. 1926), 26-27,
the last two decisions accord with the weight of authority. McPartinv. Clarkson, 240
Mich. 390, 215 N.W. 338, 54 A.L.R. 1535 (1927); Swift & Co. v. Tempelos, [78 N.C.
487, io S.E. 8, 7 A.L.R. 1581 (igxg). But it has been definitely settled that the Illinois
Bulk Sales Law has broader application than that given the statute in other states.
Weskaldies v. HesternIan, 288 Ill. i99, 123 N.E. 314, 4 A.L.R. i28 (I919) (sale by dairy
farmer of his livestock, agricultural, and other implements); La Salle Opera House Co.
v. La Salle Amusement Co.., 289 Ill. 194, 124 N.E. 454 (1919) (sale by opera house company of lease, furniture, fixtures, etc., together with good will, trade mark, and trade
names).
In the La Salle case the court did not discuss the question whether or not intangible
property was covered by the statute. But the Illinois act has been applied where a
debtor assigned accounts, bills receivable, and other evidences of indebtedness for the
benefit of creditors. Danville Auburn Auto Co. v. National Trust & Credit Co., 212 I.
App. ii6 (i9i8). See Hershberger, Illinois Bulk Sales Law and Assignments for Benefit
of Creditors, 21 Ill. L. Rev. 153 (1926). The transfer of the assets of one doing business
as a partner has also been held to be within the act. National Trust & Credit Co. v.
Kiminghant, 2oi Ill. App. 78 (1905); Marlow v. Ringer, 79 W.Va. 568, 9i S.E. 386,
L.R.A. 1g7D 623 (1917); contra Schoeppel v. Pfannensteil, 122 Kan. 630, 253 Pac.

567, 51 A.L.R. 398 (1927). However, in a well reasoned opinion the transfer of assets
to a successor bank has been held outside the scope of the Illinois Bulk Sales Law:
first, because under the rule of ejusden generis the words "other goods and chattels of
the vendor's business" refer to tangible personal property; second, because the opinion
in Off & Co. v. Morehead, supra,in holding the act of 1905 discriminatory, referred only
to other kinds of tangible personalty; and third, because other jurisdictions do not
apply the act to transfers of intangible personalty. People ex rel. Nelson v. Sherrard
State Bank, 258 Ill. App. i68 (1930). Decisions of other courts exempt intangible personalty, except in the transfer of a partner's interest. Starr Piano Co. v. Sammak, 235
N.Y. 566, 139 N.E. 737 (1923); Rio Tire Co. v. Spectralite, 48 S.W. (2d) 367 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932). It would seem that the principal case is rightly decided on this point.
HUBERT C. MERRcIK

Conflict of Laws-Law Governing Performance of a Covenant to Pay Rent[Federal] .- L, in Chicago, signed and mailed to T, a Maryland corporation, a lease to
a store located in Chicago. T signed the lease in Maryland. In a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding in Maryland it was held that the question of apportionability of rent
is to be determined by the law of Maryland, the lex loci contractus. In re Newark Shoe
Stores, 2 F. Supp. 384 (D.C.D.Md. 1933).

The court relied upon a recent Circuit Court of Appeals case, In re Barnett, 12 F.
(2d) 73, (C.C.A. 2d 1926) in which the court said that the obligation to pay rent is an

independent covenant and the law of the place of contract will govern what is sufficient
performance.
In the Barnett case the court recognized that a lease is in some respects a convey-

